PRESIDENCY WORKING DOCUMENT
(The Netherlands, 5 - 7 September 2004)
Agriculture under the public eye:
who is responsible for what?
Agriculture under the public eye: who is responsible
for what?
Every
Member State strives for sustainable, competitive and socially more acceptable
agriculture. But, how can these goals be achieved? And who is responsible for
doing so? What role should national government play, what should the European
Commission do and what should be the responsibility of the private sector?
These are important questions that the Netherlands presidency would like to
discuss at the informal Council meeting. Why do we raise these questions? Well,
because European agriculture and our European policies are being challenged by
a number of important new developments.
First, we
are facing globalisation of world trade, consumer-led quality requirements,
environmental concerns and an enlarged Union. In recent years, the European
Common agricultural policy has reacted to these developments by several
reforms. Instead, policies have become more oriented towards satisfying the
general public’s growing demands regarding food safety, food quality, product
differentiation, animal welfare, environmental quality and the conservation of
nature and the countryside. A series of public crises accelerated this change.
Second, the
structure of the food industry has changed fundamentally into well‑managed
integrated global supply chains and this integration process will continue in
the near future. These global food supply chains have developed their own food
safety and quality assurance schemes to meet the requirements of the general
public.
Third, we
all know from experience that the various dimensions of sustainable development
are not easy to reconcile. Too many regulations, for example, could impede the
competitive position of the European agro-food sector, especially now that
liberalisation is forging ahead. This is addressed in the Lisbon Strategy. It
is more or less common practice for national governments and European
authorities to lay down public goals in legislation in order to promote more
sustainable agriculture.
But:
·
Is
this the only way to ensure our public goals, or would it be possible to let
the private sector take more responsibility for safeguarding public values on
food safety, environment or animal welfare?
·
Should
government merely determine certain prior conditions, and where should we draw
the line?
·
Will
the public accept greater responsibility of private players in safeguarding
public goals? And do they have enough information to make a decision that takes
account of all the relevant issues?
·
What
has to be regulated by the European Union and what should be left to the
individual Member States?
The time may have come to reconsider the
balance between private and public players: between market and government. The
Netherlands Presidency would like to find out whether the Agriculture Council
and the Commission share this view. Moreover, the Presidency would like to
explore what role the Council and the Commission could play in the general
discussion that takes place in this field.
New desires
and preferences of society, globalisation of world trade and the need to
accommodate new Member States have meant that the EU could not continue to
support production as in the past. The era of the concerted attempt to raise
production is over and today’s society has completely different expectations of
agriculture:
These are
the burning questions, as again recently confirmed in a European public opinion
poll:
In
other words, modern society expects a sustainable agriculture. Therefore,
European policies are increasingly geared towards more sustainable agriculture ensuring that future generations
can enjoy the benefits of Europe’s unique environmental heritage and natural
resources, as we do today. Achieving
sustainability means meeting three challenges:
In future,
the vast majority of the CAP subsidies will be paid independently of the volume
of production. Abolishing the link between subsidies and production will
further increase the competitiveness and market orientation of EU farmers,
while providing the necessary income stability. The EU has also developed a set
of policies aiming to meet the ecological and social challenge. For example,
the Nitrate Directive and the EU Water Framework Directive to take account of
concerns in the area of environment, the Birds and Habitats Directives in the
framework of nature management, regulations on hygiene and BSE in
slaughterhouses to safeguard food safety, and directives on transport and housing
of farm animals to improve animal welfare. With the introduction of compulsory
cross compliance, the new "single farm payments" will be linked to
these policies.
Not only
European policies are changing fundamentally in order to be able to look the
public straight in the eye. The food chain itself is also changing
significantly. The speed of change has accelerated dramatically over the last
ten years. The opening up of Central Europe and the collapse of the Soviet
Empire were all accompanied by massive changes in the rest of the world. From
1991 onwards, governments in India and Brazil began liberalising their
economies. China continued and consolidated a process of economic reform, and
South Africa ended its long isolation. Within a period of three to five years
most countries in the world were becoming a part of a world market.
In the globalisation process, the food
and agricultural industry has moved from independent producers and marketing
firms to integrated and multinational supply chains. During the OECD
“Conference on changing dimensions of the food economy: exploring the policy
issues”, held in The Hague in February 2003, several trends were signalled in
the new global food economy (Kinsey, 2003):
1. The supply chain has become a
demand/supply loop where information about consumer demand heavily influences
what is produced and when it is delivered.
2. The tasks of moving food and
agricultural products from field to fork are performed by a diverse set of
firms and agencies in complex, often global networks, involving private
contracts, public agencies and diverse consumers.
3. As parties in the food network
become more tightly integrated, the role of international trade policy, as it
relates to agriculture, is weakened. Nation states’ trade agreements are still
vital for opening borders, but private parties negotiate the characteristics of
the products that are traded.
4. Consumers continue to seek value
(quality at low prices) and convenience and retailers who provide both are
leading the retail industry and changing the business model for everyone in the
food chain.
5. Horizontal consolidation of firms in
all segments of the food chain is being promoted by the economies of scale that
come with business to business e-commerce, forward contracting and the
purchasing power of large retailers.
6. Public policy is focusing less on
protecting small farmers or feeding the hungry, and more on consumer issues
like the costs of health care in the face of rising diabetes and obesity, the
safety of the food supply in the face of bio terrorism, the identity of food
sources, be it country or genetic strain and the potential for
monopolistic/monopsonistic retailers to exploit both consumers and suppliers.
Though food
is safer than ever, consumers in Western Europe, increasingly worry about the
safety and quality of their food and about the production circumstances and
their effects on environment and animal welfare. This concern has been fuelled
by the possible link between BSE and human illness, by the widespread incidence
of illnesses from contaminated food sources and by the growing awareness of the
impact of farm production practices on the environment and animal welfare. This
results in increasing demands for food products with known and documented
characteristics and with certified attributes.
Certification
The food
industry has responded to these demands by the development and implementation
of mandatory and voluntary quality control, management, and assurance schemes.
Such schemes include, for example, certification systems for meat supply chains
guaranteeing the ability to trace fresh and processed meat back to the original
animal and farm, certification schemes aimed at guaranteeing both product
quality and environmental management of farms, and labelling and certification
schemes covering organic and natural production. These schemes are an important
part of the changes in the way food products are produced, marketed and traded
in Europe (Bredahl et al, 2001).
Quality
assurance schemes define a series of technical requirements for producing,
processing or transporting food, and may include standards for environmental
and other management practices. The schemes also include an inspection system
to verify that members comply with these requirements. Labels or quality marks
from these programmes provide an indicator of a product attribute, such as
animal welfare, organic production practices, or some aspects of food safety,
such as permitted uses of veterinary medicine.
The development,
operation and interaction of private food quality assurance schemes will be an
increasingly important determinant of the competitiveness of agricultural and
food industries through their effects on production, prices and transaction
costs (buying and selling costs). Fulfilling the requirements may increase
production costs, but a well organised and credible quality assurance system
may also reduce transaction costs. In particular, the costs associated with
searching and screening for suitable customers or suppliers and the costs
involved in negotiating and monitoring the terms of a contract may be reduced.
Moreover, well organised quality assurance schemes may also provide a price
premium from the provision of an extrinsic (visible) cue of production
practices, as well as the intrinsic (experience) attributes of the product like
taste, texture or convenience. Finally, these schemes may largely localise
damage in case of emergency situations.
If the advantages outweigh the extra efforts, quality assurance schemes may convey a competitive advantage to producers covered by the programme. For example, all of the large food retail chains in the United Kingdom require farm assured livestock. Clearly, in order to source this primary market, quality assurance scheme membership has become de facto mandatory, conveying an advantage to suppliers participating in the schemes and a disadvantage to those who do not. (Bredahl et al, 2001).
Many
schemes have been developed in recent years. In the Netherlands for example 99
percent of the dairy farms are certified to deliver milk meeting the KKM (Chain
Quality Milk) standards. This is a private initiative to strengthen the
Netherlands dairy sector’s market position. The standards cover the use of
veterinary medicines, animal health and welfare, the use of feed and water,
hygiene, environment and waste. Similar standards apply in the IKB concept
(Integrated Chain Management) in the Netherlands meat sector. Examples in other
Member States are the British Retail Consortium scheme, the Danish Quality
Guarantee scheme and the International Food Standard (IFS). Quality assurance
schemes related to geographical origin play an important role in several Member
States (like Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). These schemes involve greater
government controls. Also more government‑controlled is the French “agriculture
raisonnée” certification system.
Initiatives
are not only taken on a national level.
In 1997 a group of 26 retail organisations belonging to the Euro-Retailer
Produce Working Group (EUREP) took the initiative to develop and harmonise
widely accepted standards and procedures for the global certification of Good
Agricultural Practices, known as EUREPGAP. Technically speaking, EUREPGAP is a
set of normative documents suitable to be accredited to internationally
recognised certification criteria. Representatives from around the globe and
all stages of the food chain, including consumer and environmental
organisations, have been involved in the development of these documents.
Another
international example is the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) taken in 2000
by 50 international retailers (with 65 % share of the global retail
market). In the meantime EUREPGAP, the British Retail Consortium and other certification
schemes have become elements of the GFSI.
Increasingly
important, too, are intra-industry
arrangements and initiatives for the development of standards for deliveries
between companies within the chain. Examples are the Forest Stewardship Council
for sustainable produced or harvested wood, the Marine Stewardship Council for
sustainable fisheries, the Global Food Lab Initiative and the Sustainable
Agricultural Initiative platform. With these initiatives, participants aim to
take their corporate responsibility in sustainable development seriously,
meanwhile realising that this also serves long-term economic goals. Moreover,
these initiatives diminish the risk of being blamed for socially,
environmentally or otherwise unacceptable production methods within the chain.
Companies with strong brand names, especially, prefer to avoid forms of
production in the chain that could damage their positive images and brand
names. Another question in this respect relates to liability. If the private
sector gets involved in more quality assurance systems, and consequently, the
government gets a more modest role, customers of the private sector have to
turn automatically to the market parties if problems arise
The
consolidation and internationalisation of the food retail and manufacturing
industry is expected to continue. In the near future, four or five large retail
organisations will be operating on a world-wide scale. There will, however also
be a number of dominant regional and national retailers. A similar situation
will exist among the large (A-brand) food processing industries.
About ten
food manufacturers will be operating globally, with 20 to 25 global brands. Furthermore, a small number of
international fast food chains and catering services increasingly dominate the
market for “away from home meals” in for instance restaurants, canteens and
hospitals.
The
following figures illustrate the situation among retailers. In the period
1993-1999, the aggregate concentration of the top 10 grocery retailers in the EU-15
grew by 25 percent, whereas the market share of the bottom 10 companies in the
EU-15 top 50 declined by more than 70 percent. The larger are getting larger
and the smaller are being squeezed (Dobson, 2003). The Institute of Grocery
Distribution, a food sector research institute, predicts that, based on
historical growth rates in European turnovers for the last five years, the top
ten retailers will increase their market share from 37 to 60 percent by 2010.
Table 1 illustrates that the share held by the top three firms in EU-15
countries ranged in 2001 from 32 percent in Greece and Italy to 95 percent in
Sweden. Some emerging giants such as Carrefour, Aldi, Tesco and Ahold operated
in several countries under their own company name or had, partly or fully, the
ownership of local companies.
In a
minority of Member States (for example Greece, Italy and Spain) distribution of
food is organised in a more traditional way, whereas the role of multinational
retailers is far from dominating.
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
Combined share
|
Sweden |
ICA |
OF |
AXFOOD |
95% |
Norway |
NORGESGRUPPEN |
HAKON |
COOP |
86% |
Netherlands |
AHOLD |
LAURUS |
SU |
83% |
Finland |
KESKO |
SOK |
SUOMEN SPAR |
80% |
Denmark |
FDB |
DANSK SUPERMARKT |
SUPERGROS |
78% |
Austria |
BML-REWE |
SPAR |
ADEG |
78% |
Switzerland |
MIGROS |
COOP |
PRIMO
VISAVIS |
76% |
France |
CARREFOUR |
LECLERC/SYS U |
INTERMARCHE |
64% |
Belgium |
CARREFOUR |
DELHAIZE |
COLRUYT |
60% |
UK |
TESCO |
SAINSBURY |
ASDA |
58% |
Germany |
EDEKA |
REWE |
ALDI |
57% |
Ireland |
TESCO |
DUNNES |
SUPERVALUE |
54% |
Portugal |
SONAE |
JMR |
INTERMARCHE |
52% |
Spain |
CARREFOUR |
EROSKI
GROUP |
AUCHAN |
44% |
Italy |
COOP |
CONAD |
CARREFOUR |
32% |
Greece |
CARREFOUR |
ALFA
BETA |
VEROPOULOUS |
32% |
Source: Capgemini, 2002
Nowadays, strong concentrations in the
food chain also take place in the new Member States of the Union. Well known
examples can be found in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.
Similar developments are being signalled
in other parts of the world like in China, Thailand and Brazil. On the one side
they are very welcome for their knowledge and for their investment and
organisation of qualitative high-ranking production, processing and retailing
systems of food. On the other side they are questioned for their increasing
dominance on domestic markets.
As a result
of the concentration process in most Member States, retailers will increasingly
operate as, we might say, consumer buying agents or as protectors of consumers’
interest. By demanding participation of their suppliers in quality assurance
schemes, retailers and other big players in the food chain will no longer buy
individual products or assortments. Rather, they will buy – and control – the
total process, from ingredients through production, ensuring that the finished
product will meet the needs of consumers (Capgemini, 2002).
Small
farmers and retailers frequently have an insufficient economic scale for
complying with all the requirements demanded of them by these schemes. They may
therefore be forced out of business. This is especially the case for small
producers in developing countries. They feel more and more uncomfortable with
the increasing quality standards and even see them as new protectionism
measures by western countries.
While
companies have introduced tougher specifications for suppliers and new
traceability controls (plough to plate or stable to table), governments have
introduced new policies. These range from the creation of the European Food
Authority and changes in the focus and names of Ministries (for example in the
UK, Germany and The Netherlands) to the introduction of a number of regulations
to meet public concerns about the production of food. This creates an important
duality. On the one side, we find a State system of regulation, on the other
side a system of self-regulation, largely driven by the major players in the
supply chain (Barling and Lang, 2003).
This has
consequences for all parties in the chain, including farmers. For example,
farmers have to meet numerous standards based on European legislation
safeguarding environmental, food safety and animal
welfare standards. At the same time, they have to fulfil the demands of private
quality assurance schemes.
In
many cases private schemes contain elements that go much further than the
requirements laid down in public legislation. Nevertheless, both the European
system, the State system and the system of self-regulation have their own
specific control regimes with different documents, inspection agencies etc.
This means that there is some kind of double check on the same objectives. This
may result in unnecessary burdens for the sector, impeding its competitiveness
on the global market. Clearly, wether
the issue of control can vary amongst different subjects and in this regard
deserves closer consideration.
The issue
of regulatory costs and its impact on the competitive position of European
producers is an important element in the Lisbon strategy. In the Lisbon
strategy documents, the Commission states that regulations can place costly
burdens on European enterprises and may impede the necessary dynamics.
According to OECD estimates, the costs of regulation at European level, but
also as a result of national and regional regulation, will be between three and
five percent of the EU-15’s GDP. Farmers in the Netherlands claim that they
need on average seven hours a week to finish all government paperwork (almost
half of it originating from the Ministry of Agriculture). Initiatives are
needed to improve the regulatory environment at all levels. With further
liberalisation on the horizon as a result of the Doha Development Agenda, a
simple and effective regulatory environment for the agro-food complex is
essential to improve the competitiveness and vitality of European agriculture
and agribusiness.
The Lisbon
conclusions also stress that formal regulation is not always the answer.
Alternatives such as co-regulation, self-regulation or agreements between the
social partners can sometimes provide more effective solutions (COM, 2001/79
final). The challenge is to reach the goals set in the ecological and social
spheres while avoiding over-regulation.
The White
Paper on European Governance, (COM, 2001/428 final) proposes opening up the
policy-making process to get more people and organisations involved in shaping
and delivering EU policy. One of the proposals in the White Paper is to make
greater use of the skills and practical experience of regional and local
players. It is also proposed to define policy objectives more clearly and
improve effectiveness by combining legislation with non-legislative and
self-regulatory solutions.
EU-Action Plan
As a
follow-up to the White Paper, the Commission stated in the June 2002 “Action Plan for better Regulation” that EU
laws should be written in a less complicated style, making it easier for Member
State authorities to implement them. European legislation should also be easier
to understand for the public. As part of the action plan the Commission adopted
a broad set of measures with a view to improving the decision-making in the
European Union. From the beginning of 2003, a set of general principles and
minimum standards concerning public consultation of interested parties apply
for all major Commission policy initiatives.
Furthermore,
from 2003 each major policy initiative includes an analysis of the measure’s
impact. Social, economic and environmental impacts have to be assessed for
major initiatives when policies are being devised. This new mechanism
integrates and broadens the various impact procedures used by the Commission.
The results of each assessment are made public. According to the Commission,
such impact assessment would help to ensure that the European Union stays away
from all matters that can be regulated more effectively and efficiently at
national or regional level. The EU should reconsider the subsidiarity principle
and rely more on co-regulatory approaches, whereby people and organisations
take on commitments and responsibilities for achieving objectives fixed by EU
legislators.
The Commission's report to the 2004
spring European Council restated that a favourable regulatory environment is
likewise essential if competitiveness is to improve. From this point of view
the measures described earlier should help make the Community’s regulatory
framework more effective, more flexible and simpler. The Commission’s
introduction of an impact analysis tool and the formulation of alternative
regulatory instruments – such as co-regulation and self-regulation – constitute
important steps forward that ought to be exploited.
It is clear
that promoting more sustainable and socially more acceptable agriculture
remains a challenging policy priority throughout Europe. However, as described
in this paper, governments are not the only ones working on this matter.
Private players in the chain are doing the same.
These
private players are involved in a continuing process of concentration. In most
Member States, food processing and distribution is nowadays dominated by a
small number of large chains that increasingly operate as protectors of
consumers’ interests.
Companies
are responding to ever-growing consumer demands and concerns by implementing
private quality control and assurance schemes. Often, the requirements of these
schemes go even further than those laid down in public legislation. Moreover,
both the State system and the private system have their own control
organisation. This may lead to unnecessary burdens for the sector, impeding its
competitiveness. The Lisbon conclusions stress that formal regulation is not
always the answer and that alternatives such as co-regulation, self-regulation
or agreements between the social partners can sometimes provide more effective
solutions.
The time
may therefore have come to discuss whether the developments described in this
paper should lead to a further review of the balance between market and
government. “Who is responsible for what?”
·
What
responsibility should the private sector have and what should be the
responsibility of government?
·
And on
what level, the European or national or regional one?
·
Could
a new balance between private sector and government mean that governments
restrict their activities to supervising the private sector to safeguard public
objectives?
·
Could
requirements laid down in private quality assurance schemes be accepted as
sufficient to safeguard public concerns about food safety, environment, animal
welfare and animal and plant health, or should this be solely a public
responsibility?
·
Could
for example such private requirements be used - under certain conditions - as
indicators for farms meeting their cross-compliance requirements?
·
Could
this approach lead to a more efficient way of safeguarding public goals, while
at the same time reducing the administrative burden?
·
Could
the coordination of all parties envolved in control, be enhanced by a European
Agency?
The Presidency would like to discuss
these questions by identifying three themes that need to be addressed in this
respect.
The opinion
of the public on a changing balance of responsibilities is a first subject that
should be discussed. What will the public think of a changing balance of
responsibilities?
·
Will
greater responsibility for private players in safeguarding public objectives on
food safety, environment, animal welfare etc., be acceptable to the consumer
and the citizen?
·
Does
the public have enough confidence in private systems, or is it necessary to
apply State regulations and State controls to ensure consumers’ trust in food?
A survey by
the National Institute for Consumer Research, Oslo (2003) asked respondents in
various countries to evaluate information from different institutional players
in a food scandal involving salmonella chicken. Consumers’ rank-order of
truth-telling players generated groups of two:
·
First
come consumer organisations and food experts.
·
Next
on the list are food authorities and media.
·
Ranked
as third come farmers and supermarket chains.
·
The
least supported couple of players with respect to truth telling are politicians
and the processing industry.
Should government contribute by ensuring
consumers’ trust in private systems? For example, in Germany, the government
aims to give consumers the legal right to be fully informed about the products
they purchase. The idea behind this is that only consumers who have full access
to information are able to use their power over the seller of the products.
Denmark has introduced a smiley system that informs consumers about the
hygienic quality of restaurants and other food suppliers, and the EU General
Food Law introduces the obligation for companies to be able to trace their
products one link up and one link down in the chain, from 2005 on.
A second subject to be discussed is the
impact of a changing balance of responsibilities on our trade policies. The
self-regulation systems of multinational firms may have an impact on
international trade. Trade policy is aimed at liberalising trade in
agricultural products in order to give producers around the world better access
to each other’s markets. Producers in developing countries should also benefit
from trade liberalisation. However, the role of international trade policy, as
it relates to agriculture, is becoming comparatively weaker.Nation States’
trade agreements are still vital for opening borders, but private parties
negotiate the products that are bought and sold.
Multinationals source their inputs and
build their commercial relationships with suppliers or buyers that best suit
their business strategy regardless of a nation’s public policy. This could also
mean for example, that consumer concerns are easier to safeguard by private
players with their international quality assurance schemes than by government
regulations. But:
·
What
does that mean for small producers and for producers in developing
countries? Will they also be able to
benefit from trade liberalisation?
·
Can
they comply with the regulations or are they not able to participate in the
global trade system?
·
Should
governments of developed countries and international organisations like the FAO
and the World Bank make more efforts to assist developing countries to help
their producers to fulfil the requirements laid on them by the food chain?
·
Or
does this belong to the corporate social responsibility of the private sector
itself?
The balance of responsibilities between
governments is a third subject for discussion. In an enlarging European Union
(which started with 6 and now has 25 Member States), variety of climates and
cultural and regional differences continue to grow. Availability of water for
agriculture for instance is a totally different subject in Spain or Greece than
for example in Slovenia or Ireland. In some Member States it is necessary for
governments to develop policies to regulate the distribution of water, in
others it isn’t. It is far more difficult than ever before to find “one fits
all” solutions. Furthermore, decoupled income payments offer better
opportunities for decentralising the implementation of policies than price
support. Is it not better to make increasing use of these new opportunities?
The definition of “permanent pasture” in the midterm review package is an
example of how a “one fits all” approach isn’t always workable. The aim is to
prevent the conversion of grassland into arable land, because this may have
negative consequences for the richness of biodiversity. For this reason every
Member State has to monitor, for all parcels of grassland, for at least five
years, to see whether they remain grassland or not. This approach seems to
ignore that there are Member States where a massive conversion of permanent
grassland into arable land will never occur. It would have been preferable to
give those Member States some flexibility in choosing the most efficient and
effective way of monitoring this obligation.
Similar
questions can be raised when considering whether to give private players more
responsibilities in safeguarding public policy objectives by using private
quality assurance schemes.
·
Who
decides about this and who will be responsible for supervision? Will it be the
European Union, the Member States, or regional governments?
·
What
should be strictly regulated at the European level and what could be left to
the responsibilities of the individual Member States or regions?
References:
Barling, D. and Lang, T. (2003). A Reluctant
Food Policy? Political Quarterly 74 (1), 8-18.
Bredahl, M. E., Northen, J., Boecker A., and Normile, M. A. (2001). ‘Consumer
Demand Sparks the Growth of Quality Assurance Schemes in the European Food
Sector’ in ‘Changing Structure of Global
Food Consumption and Trade’, United States Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service, Washington DC.
Capgemini, (2002) State of the Art in Food: The Changing Face of the World-wide Food
Industry, February 2002.
Commission of the European Communities, (2001).
European Governance, a White Paper,
COM (2001) 428 final, July 2001.
Commission of the European Communities, (2001).
Realising the European Union’s Potential:
Consolidating and Extending the Lisbon Strategy, COM (2001) 79 final,
February 2001.
Dobson, P. W., (2003) ‘Buyer Power in Food retailing: The European Experience’, OECD
Conference, Changing Dimensions of the
Food Economy: Exploring the Policy Issues, 6-7 February 2003, The Hague,
Netherlands.
Hughes, D. (2002). Grocery Retailing in Europe and Emerging Routes to the
Consumer. EuroChoices 1 (3), 12-17.
Jansik, C.
(2004). Food Industry FDI – An
Integrating Force between Western and Eastern European Agri-food Sectors. EuroChoices 3 (1), 12-17
Kinsey, J. (2003). “Emerging trends in the new food economy: consumers, firms and science”,
OECD Conference, Changing Dimensions
of the Food Economy: Exploring the Policy Issues, 6-7 February 2003, The
Hague, Netherlands.
National Institute for Consumer Research
(2003). Trust in Food in Europe, a
Comparative Analysis. Professional Report No.5, Oslo.